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Abstract
Previous work showed that people find explanations more satisfying when they contain irrelevant neuroscience information.
The current studies investigate why this effect happens. In Study 1 (N=322), subjects judged psychology explanations that did
or did not contain irrelevant neuroscience information. Longer explanations were judged more satisfying, as were explanations
containing neuroscience information, but these two factors made independent contributions. In Study 2 (N=255), subjects
directly compared good and bad explanations. Subjects were generally successful at selecting the good explanation except
when the bad explanation contained neuroscience and the good one did not. Study 3 (N=159) tested whether neuroscience
jargon was necessary for the effect, or whether it would obtain with any reference to the brain. Responses to these two
conditions did not differ. These results confirm that neuroscience information exerts a seductive effect on people’s judgments,
which may explain the appeal of neuroscience information within the public sphere.
Keywords: explanation, neuroscience, reasoning, seductive allure.

1 Introduction
Attention to neuroscience is growing within the public
sphere. Neuroscientific findings now play a key role in public conversations about economics, marketing, and the law,
among other areas (e.g., Ariely & Berns, 2010; Camerer,
Loewenstein & Prelec, 2005; Farah, 2012; Greene & Cohen, 2004; Roskies, 2002; Satel & Lilienfeld, 2013). For
example, neuroscience data are often used in courtrooms
as evidence of a defendant’s responsibility or guilt (Morse,
2011; Saks, Schweitzer, Aharoni & Kiehl, 2014; Schweitzer
et al., 2011). But it is not entirely clear how members of the
public view these findings. Do they understand the role that
neuroscience information plays in explanations of people’s
beliefs and behaviors?
Previous research suggests that the answer to this question is “no”. People are unduly swayed to think favorably of psychology explanations that include references to
neuroscience—even when such neuroscience information
is logically irrelevant to the explanations (Weisberg, Keil,
Goodstein, Rawson & Gray, 2008). In this study, subjects
read descriptions of psychological phenomena. Each phenomenon was followed by one of four types of explanation,
constructed by crossing explanation quality (good or bad)
with neuroscience information (present or absent). CruWe thank Matthew Bateman, Martha Farah, Diego Fernandez-Duque,
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cially, the neuroscience information was irrelevant to the
logic of the explanations and even made the good explanations worse, according to the ratings of experts.
When the explanations contained neuroscience information, ratings were significantly higher than when they did
not. This was especially true for the bad explanations (perhaps because people have trouble detecting circularity in
arguments, see Rips, 2002). That is, non-experts judged
that psychological phenomena are explained better using
the language of neuroscience, although this language should
make no difference, assuming that an explanation’s quality
is drawn primarily from the strength of its logic. One recent study (Scurich & Shniderman, 2014) also found that
subjects give higher ratings to studies that included neuroscience information, but only when the conclusions of these
studies confirmed their prior beliefs. However, the absence
of a no-neuroscience control condition in this study makes
it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the general effect
of neuroscience information.
Three other studies did include the appropriate controls,
and both confirmed Weisberg et al.’s (2008) findings. One
used the same stimuli in an exact replication (FernandezDuque, Evans, Christian & Hodges, 2015). The other
two used different sets of stimuli in a conceptual replication (Rhodes, Rodriguez & Shah, 2014; Rhodes & Shah,
2015), in which subjects read a mock news article describing psychological research; the article either did or did not
contain irrelevant neuroscience information. Neuroscience
information thus exerts a seductive allure effect, whereby
people without advanced training believe that references to
brain processes improve the quality of a psychological explanation, even when these references are logically irrelevant. This effect could be thought of as part of a family of
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heuristics that people use for judging the quality of explanations, which includes teleological information (Lombrozo
& Carey, 2006) and an intuitive sense of satisfaction (Trout,
2002).
One study claimed that neuroscience images are responsible for the effect (McCabe & Castel, 2008), suggesting
that people are seduced by the visual appeal of images generated by fMRI scans and other neuroscientific techniques.
However, many later studies have failed to replicate this
finding (Gruber & Dickerson, 2012; Hook & Farah, 2013;
Keehner, Mayberry & Fischer, 2011; Michael, Newman,
Vuorre, Cumming & Garry, 2013; see Farah & Hook, 2013,
for review). To test directly whether brain images add value
to explanations that already contained neuroscience text,
Fernandez-Duque et al. (2015) presented subjects with explanations that either contained no neuroscience information, contained irrelevant neuroscience information, or contained irrelevant neuroscience information and were accompanied by a neuroscience image. These researchers found
that people rated explanations with neuroscience information as better than explanations without this information,
as noted above, but images did not have any additional effect. Further, Weisberg et al. (2008), Fernandez-Duque et al.
(2015), Rhodes et al. (2014), and Rhodes and Shah (2015)
obtained the seductive allure effect without the use of any
pictures. These studies strongly suggest that neuroscience
imagery is not the source of the effect.
Why, then, does this effect happen? The importance of
answering this question becomes evident when we examine
the many ways in which neuroscience information is used
(and misused) in the public sphere. The proliferation of
headlines proclaiming that some drug or activity “literally
changes your brain” illustrates both how appealing neuroscience information is to the general public and how poorly
this information is understood. To take a weightier example,
attorneys may appeal to neuroscience-based evidence in order to convince a jury of a legal fact. But because this kind
of information is intuitively compelling even when it is irrelevant, such evidence may unduly bias the jury, potentially
threatening the fairness of the judicial system (see Greene &
Cohen, 2004; Morse, 2004). Similarly, in the field of education, unsubstantiated claims about how children’s brains
change or fundamental differences between boys’ and girls’
brains can lead to the implementation of educational policies or practices that seem appealing but may not actually
benefit the students (see Bruer, 1997; Goswami, 2006).
Learning why neuroscience information is alluring can
help us to develop techniques to reverse some of these
trends. The current studies begin to address this issue by
investigating three factors that might contribute to the seductive allure effect: length (Study 1), explicit appeal of neuroscience (Study 2), and jargon (Study 3). In terms of length,
the explanations in Weisberg et al. (2008) that contained
irrelevant neuroscientific information were always longer
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than the explanations that did not. Subjects may have simply rated longer explanations as better. Indeed, other work
showed that people prefer longer explanations, even if the
added length did not add to the explanation’s quality (Kikas,
2003). Study 1 thus begins our investigation of this effect by
replicating Weisberg et al. (2008) with the addition of a control for the length of the explanations.
A second possible explanation for the effect is that neuroscience information may appeal due to its authoritative
aesthetic: Explanations containing neuroscience information may look as though they have come from a suitably
scientific process, and so may be perceived as trustworthy
and therefore convincing, regardless of their content (see
Sperber, 2010). We address this issue in Study 2 by asking subjects to directly compare good and bad explanations
when they do and do not contain neuroscience information.
The third possibility that we investigate is that people are
attracted to any kind of scientific-sounding jargon because
they believe that use of these fancy terms signals higherquality science. Indeed, math-based jargon has precisely
this effect (Eriksson, 2012). We address this issue in Study
3 by comparing subjects’ ratings of explanations that use
simple references to brain processes with their ratings of explanations that use more technical terms.

2 Study 1
Study 1 was designed to determine whether the seductive allure effect results from subjects’ responses to neuroscience
information itself or from the tendency for explanations containing neuroscience information to be longer than explanations without this information. Previous work suggests that
length does not account for the effect: Fernandez-Duque et
al. (2015) found that explanations with added neuroscience
information were rated more highly than unembellished explanations, but explanations with added social psychology
information were not. In addition, Rhodes et al. (2014)
found that stimuli with neuroscience information were rated
more highly than length-matched stimuli without neuroscience information. These results suggest that the seductive
allure effect cannot be accounted for solely by the explanations’ length.
Study 1 continued this investigation of the role of length
and addressed a potential issue with the method used in
previous studies. Both Fernandez-Duque et al. (2015)
and Rhodes et al. (2014) controlled for length by making the without-neuroscience explanations longer, so as to
match the length of the with-neuroscience stimuli. But
this additional information may have affected how subjects
rated the without-neuroscience explanations. For example,
Fernandez-Duque et al. (2015) compared explanations with
superfluous information from social science or hard sciences
to those with superfluous neuroscience information. How-
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ever, this information from other fields may have seemed
less relevant to the explanations than the neuroscience information, potentially lowering subjects’ ratings. Thus this
design does not separate the effect of length from the effect of different types of added information. The current
study made the with-neuroscience explanations shorter so
as to match the length of the without-neuroscience stimuli.
This more fully un-confounds the variables of length and
neuroscience information.
Study 1 thus provides a more complete investigation of
the potential effect of length on the seductive allure effect,
which will allow us to determine how neuroscience information affects people’s judgments. If the seductive allure effect
is only due to a general tendency to judge longer explanations as better, then it should disappear when the explanations that do and do not contain neuroscience are matched
for length. But if something about neuroscience information leads to more positive judgments of explanations, then
the effect of neuroscience should remain regardless of the
length of the explanation.

2.1

Method

Subjects. We recruited subjects from two populations:
undergraduate students from the psychology subject pool at
the University of Pennsylvania and workers on Mechanical
Turk. Because previous work on this topic has primarily
used undergraduates as subjects, we added the MTurk workers in order to assess the generality of the effect in a more
representative population. This study included 204 undergraduates (143 women, 61 men; mean age = 19.8 years,
range = 18–50) and 177 MTurk workers (85 women, 92
men; mean age = 37.5 years, range = 19–70). Undergraduates received course credit for participating in the study, and
MTurk workers received 20 cents.
Design. Subjects were divided into 4 conditions according to a 2 (Neuroscience: with, without) x 2 (Length: long,
short) design. These were both between-subjects variables,
so an individual subject saw explanations that either all included or all did not include neuroscience information, and
their explanations would all come from the same length category. There were 43 MTurk workers and 44 undergraduates in With Neuroscience-Long, 40 MTurk workers and
65 undergraduates in With Neuroscience-Short, 49 MTurk
workers and 50 undergraduates in Without NeuroscienceLong, and 45 MTurk workers and 45 undergraduates in
Without Neuroscience-Short. Quality was a within-subjects
variable; for each trial, the survey software randomly determined whether to show the good or bad version of the
explanation.1
1 Due to the randomization, there were 47 subjects who saw either good
explanations on every trial or bad explanations on every trial. The inclusion
of these subjects did not affect any analyses, so they were left in the sample.
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Materials. We selected four of the 18 items presented to
subjects in Weisberg et al. (2008) and Fernandez-Duque et
al. (2015) (babies’ abilities to do simple arithmetic, attentional blink, gender differences in spatial reasoning, and differences between seeing and imagining objects; see supplemental materials for full stimulus items). These were items
for which subjects in a pilot sample consistently judged
the bad version of the without-neuroscience explanation as
worse than the good version of that explanation. Each of
the four items consisted of a description of a psychological phenomenon and eight different explanations for that
phenomenon. The good explanations are the ones that the
researchers themselves provided for the phenomena or that
were provided in psychology textbooks. The bad explanations were circular restatements of the phenomena with no
mechanistic information that could give a reason for the phenomenon. Items in all studies are in the supplement.
The explanations used in the Without NeuroscienceShort and the With Neuroscience-Long conditions exactly
matched those used in Weisberg et al. (2008). To construct
the Without Neuroscience-Long explanations, we added superfluous wording to the existing Without NeuroscienceShort explanations to make them the same length as the corresponding With Neuroscience-Long explanations. Importantly, this additional wording referred only to psychological
constructs and never to other sciences, mathematics, or neuroscience, and this information did not add any value to the
explanation. To construct the With Neuroscience-Short explanations, we edited the existing With Neuroscience-Long
explanations to make them the same length as the corresponding Without Neuroscience-Short explanations. Regardless of length, the irrelevant neuroscience information
was identical across the good and bad versions of the explanations for each phenomenon.
Procedure. All subjects completed an online survey distributed on Qualtrics. In each trial, subjects read a description of a psychological phenomenon, which appeared in isolation on the screen for 10 seconds before they were allowed
to advance to the next screen. On the second screen of each
trial, the phenomenon appeared again at the top, followed by
one of the eight possible explanations for that phenomenon.
Subjects were asked to judge how satisfying they found this
explanation on a seven-point scale, from –3 (very unsatisfying) to +3 (very satisfying), with 0 as the neutral midpoint.
Each subject saw all four stimulus items, one per trial, in
a randomized order. On each trial, the phenomenon was presented along with one version of the explanation. Subjects’
condition determined whether they saw a long or short version and a with- or without-neuroscience version. Whether
they saw a good or bad version of the explanation was randomly determined on each trial (as described above in the
Design section). At the end of the survey, subjects provided
basic demographic information: age in years, gender, and
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Table 1: Study 1 mixed-effects linear regression model (∗
p < .05).

Figure 1: Average ratings of explanation quality in Study
1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the
means.

Note: This regression predicted subjects’ ratings of the quality of the explanations. The intercept represents the Without
Neuroscience condition, short explanations, undergraduate
subjects, and bad explanations. Item is deviation coded,
such that the coefficient for each level represents deviation
from the grand mean; Item 1 is the reference level.
level of education (for the MTurk subjects) or class year and
major (for the undergraduates).

2.2

Results

Unlike in Weisberg et al. (2008), some subjects in the current study received unequal numbers of good and bad explanations. In order to deal with this, we conducted a mixedeffects linear regression. The model included random intercepts by subject as well as random slopes by subject for
the effect of Quality (the only within-subjects variable). We
tested effects of Item, Group (MTurk or undergraduates),
Length (long or short), Neuroscience (present or absent),
and Quality (good or bad) and their interactions2 ; the model
that best fit the data is shown in Table 1.
2 Preliminary analyses revealed one effect of gender: an interaction between gender and explanation length. Men’s ratings did not differ for long
explanations (M = 0.27, SD = 1.75) and short explanations (M = 0.33, SD
= 1.74). However, women rated long explanations (M = 0.38, SD = 1.76)
more highly than short explanations (M = –0.03, SD = 1.81). We have no
explanation for this unexpected gender difference, and because gender did
not affect the other variables, we did not consider gender for the remainder

3

Study 1

1

2

Good Explanations
Bad Explanations

0

5.00∗
3.21∗
–8.82∗
9.41∗
2.55∗
2.70∗
3.18∗
8.47∗
–0.72
2.93∗
–3.45∗
0.50
2.34∗
–2.71∗
1.06
–1.94∗
–3.57∗

−1

[ 0.14, 0.34]
[ 0.10, 0.38]
[–0.74, –0.47]
[ 0.21, 0.79]
[ 0.02, 0.21]
[ 0.03, 0.22]
[ 0.06, 0.25]
[ 0.28, 0.44]
[–0.19, 0.10]
[ 0.06, 0.34]
[–0.37, –0.10]
[–0.11, 0.17]
[ 0.01, 0.30]
[–0.34, –0.05]
[–0.08, 0.20]
[–0.28, –0.02]
[–0.38, –0.12]

−2

0.24
0.24
–0.61
0.65
0.12
0.13
0.15
0.36
–0.05
0.20
–0.24
0.03
0.16
–0.19
0.08
–0.14
–0.25

t

−3

Intercept
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Length
Neuroscience
Group
Quality
Neuroscience x Item 2
Neuroscience x Item 3
Neuroscience x Item 4
Group x Item 2
Group x Item 3
Group x Item 4
Quality x Item 2
Quality x Item 3
Quality x Item 4

Estimate [95% CI]

Average Rating

Predictor

Without Neuroscience

With Neuroscience

This test revealed a main effect of Quality (Figure 1),
where good explanations (M = 0.58, SD = 1.68) were rated
more highly than bad explanations (M = –0.13, SD = 1.80).
There was also a main effect of Neuroscience: Explanations
that contained neuroscience (M = 0.34, SD = 1.75) were
rated more highly than explanations that did not (M = 0.11,
SD = 1.80). We also found a main effect of Length: Long
explanations (M = 0.34, SD = 1.76) were rated more highly
than short explanations (M = 0.12, SD = 1.79). Finally, there
was a main effect of Group: MTurk workers (M = 0.37, SD
= 1.73) gave overall higher ratings than undergraduates (M
= 0.10, SD = 1.80).
The effects of Group, Neuroscience, and Quality also varied by item, as indicated by the significant interactions. To
examine these interactions, we conducted separate linear regressions for each item examining main effects of Group,
Neuroscience, Length, and Quality. The results are summarized in Table 2. Although the magnitudes (and therefore
significance levels) of the effects varied by item, only two
effects were not in the predicted directions; for Item 4, there
were non-significant negative effects of Group and Neuroscience. The effects of neuroscience for Item 2 and quality
for Item 4 were small and non-significant, but in the predicted directions.
of our analyses.
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Table 2: Regression coefficients for individual item analysis
in Study 1 (∗ p < .05, + p < .10).
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4
Length
Neuroscience
Group
Quality

2.3

0.04
0.22∗
0.14
0.69∗

0.05
0.08
0.18∗
0.44∗

0.17+ 0.19∗
0.34∗ –0.10
0.30∗ –0.06
0.23∗ 0.08

Discussion

Study 1 was designed to replicate the seductive allure effect
and test for the contribution of explanation length. Subjects
did indeed judge longer explanations as better than shorter
ones overall, demonstrating a general bias towards longer
explanations. However, this length preference does not fully
explain the seductive allure of neuroscience. Making explanations longer does make them seem better, but adding neuroscience information does as well, and these two modifications had independent effects. This result confirms other recent studies that show that the seductive allure effect obtains
when explanation length is controlled (Fernandez-Duque et
al., 2015; Rhodes et al., 2014).
There was also a strong effect of explanation quality:
Good explanations were judged as better than bad explanations overall. This result demonstrates that people are not
generally confused about what makes certain explanations
better than others and are able to distinguish between good
and bad explanations. However, as noted above, the addition
of neuroscience information interferes with this ability.
Finally, we found that undergraduates gave overall lower
ratings than MTurk workers. This is likely not due to the undergraduates having a higher level of education, since 99%
of the MTurk workers reported having at least some college
education, and 50% reported earning an advanced degree.
Instead, the experience of participating in research as part
of a class, or of currently being a member of an educational
community, may serve to increase overall skepticism. Regardless, both populations showed the same general pattern
of responses to the explanations (i.e., there were no significant interactions with subject group).
These main effects appeared in nearly the same way for
all four items; however, there were some differences in how
subjects responded to the four phenomena. Notably, the
phenomenon describing the differences between seeing and
imagining objects (Item 4) did not show an effect of Quality
or Neuroscience. This item was rated higher overall than the
others (as indicated by the significant main effect for Item 4
in the regression), and there was little difference in ratings
between the different versions of the explanation. In addition, the phenomenon describing attentional blink (Item 2)
did not show as strong of an effect of Neuroscience. This
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may be due to the fact that the neuroscience information in
the explanations of this phenomenon is entirely contained in
the first sentence, separate from the explanatory (or circular) information in the second sentence. This structure may
have made it easier for subjects to see that the neuroscience
information was not relevant to the explanation’s quality.
Overall, Study 1 demonstrates that the seductive allure effect replicates and is not solely due to length. Study 2 begins
to more directly address why the effect happens. To do so,
rather than asking subjects to rate single explanations for a
phenomenon, we ask them to choose which of two explanations they find most satisfying. Each pair contained a good
explanation and a bad explanation, but either both contained
neuroscience, neither contained neuroscience, or only the
bad explanation contained neuroscience. This is a somewhat less ecologically valid design, since it is rare that people would need to evaluate multiple explanations for a single
phenomenon. However, this design allows us to test directly
how neuroscience information may interfere with people’s
ability to distinguish good from bad explanations. Given
previous results, we expected that subjects would generally
be able to distinguish good from bad explanations if both or
neither contained neuroscience. If, however, neuroscience
information has the effect of masking the poor quality of the
bad explanations, people should be less likely to distinguish
good from bad explanations when only the bad one contains
neuroscience.

3 Study 2
3.1

Method

Subjects. This study included 130 undergraduates (86 female, 44 male; mean age = 19.5 years, range = 18–27) and
130 MTurk workers (90 female, 37 male, three unreported;
mean age = 40.6 years, range = 19–71). The undergraduates were recruited from the psychology subject pool at the
University of Pennsylvania and received course credit for
their participation. The MTurk workers were recruited from
Amazon’s system and were paid 20 cents for their participation. An additional seven subjects (three MTurk workers
and four undergraduates) were recruited but excluded from
the final analyses for failing an attention check (described
below).
Design. There were three between-subjects conditions in
this study. As in Study 1, there were four trials per subject,
each of which used a different phenomenon (order randomized). Each phenomenon was accompanied by both a good
and a bad explanation. In the Without Neuroscience condition (41 MTurk workers and 43 undergraduates), neither
explanation contained any neuroscience information, and in
the With Neuroscience condition (42 MTurk workers and 45

Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 10, No. 5, September 2015

undergraduates), both explanations contained neuroscience
information. The crucial condition was the Mixed condition
(47 MTurk workers and 42 undergraduates), in which the
good explanation did not contain neuroscience information
and the bad one did, pitting quality and neuroscience against
each other.
Materials. We used the same four phenomena as in Study
1, accompanied by the short versions of the four possible
explanations for each phenomenon: good and bad explanations both with and without irrelevant neuroscience information (see supplemental materials).
Procedure. Subjects completed an online survey distributed on Qualtrics. For each trial, they first read a description of a psychological phenomenon, which appeared in isolation on the screen for 10 seconds before they were allowed
to advance to the next screen. On the second screen of each
trial, the phenomenon appeared again at the top, followed
by the prompt, “Please choose which explanation you find
more satisfying.” Subjects always saw one good explanation and one bad explanation as well as the choice “both are
equal.” The “equal” option always appeared in the center,
with the left/right position of the good and bad explanations
randomized across trials. After making their choice, subjects were asked to explain why they had made that choice
in one or two sentences. There were four such trials in the
experiment, each involving a different phenomenon and its
accompanying explanations.
After the second of the four trials, subjects engaged in an
attention check. Following methods recommended in Oppenheimer, Meyvis & Davidenko (2009), this checking trial
presented another phenomenon and two explanations so that
it looked superficially like the other four trials. For this trial,
we included instructions at the end of the phenomenon description telling subjects to choose the “equal” option and to
write that they had done so as their justification. As noted
above, we excluded seven subjects who failed this check
by selecting a different option. At the end of the survey,
subjects provided the same demographic information as in
Study 1: age, gender, and education level.

3.2

Results

To analyze the data, we conducted a mixed-effects logistic
regression predicting whether subjects selected the good explanation on each trial, considering this response as correct
and the other two responses (selecting the bad explanation
or the “both are equal” option) as incorrect. The model included random intercepts by subject. We tested effects of
Item, Group (MTurk workers or undergraduates), Condition
(With Neuroscience, Without Neuroscience or Mixed), and
possible interactions. Preliminary analyses found no effect
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Table 3: Study 2 mixed-effects logistic regression model (∗
p < .05).
Predictor

Estimate SE

Intercept
0.05
Item 2
0.67
Item 3
–0.25
Item 4
–0.94
Group
0.25
Without Neuroscience condition
0.63
With Neuroscience condition
1.12
Group x Item 2
–0.20
Group x Item 3
0.19
Group x Item 4
0.37
Without Neuroscience cond. x Group –0.49
With Neuroscience cond. x Group –0.53

0.14
0.13
0.12
0.13
0.14
0.21
0.22
0.13
0.12
0.12
0.21
0.21

z
0.33
5.05∗
–2.08∗
–7.44∗
1.75
3.08∗
5.18∗
–1.52
1.53
3.05∗
–2.37∗
–2.48∗

Note. The intercept represents the Mixed condition and undergraduate subjects. Item is deviation coded, such that the
coefficient for each level represents deviation from the grand
mean; Item 1 is the reference level.

of gender, so this variable is not considered further. The
model that best fit the data is presented in Table 3.
The primary result from these analyses is the significant
main effect of condition: Subjects found it more difficult
to determine which was the good explanation in the Mixed
condition where only the bad explanation contained neuroscience (Figure 2). Specifically, subjects were significantly more likely to select the good explanation in either
the With Neuroscience (72.0% of trials) or Without Neuroscience (63.5% of trials) conditions than in the Mixed condition (51.7% of trials).
There was also a significant Group x Condition interaction. Follow-up regressions conducted on each group separately showed that the MTurk workers were significantly
more likely to select the good explanation in the With Neuroscience condition as compared to the Mixed condition (β
= 0.58, p < .05), but there was no significant difference between the Without Neuroscience and Mixed conditions (β
= 0.15, p = .59). For undergraduate subjects, subjects selected the good option significantly more often in both the
With Neuroscience (β = 1.68, p < .001) and Without Neuroscience (β = 1.14, p < .001) conditions than in the Mixed
condition. Thus, although the main effect of condition was
significant in the whole sample, it was driven more by the
undergraduate subjects than by the MTurk workers. Finally,
although there were significant differences between items,
as in Study 1, there was not a significant Item x Condition or
Item x Condition x Group interaction. Therefore, the effect
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Figure 2: Average number of trials on which subjects selected the good explanation in Study 2. Error bars represent
95% confidence intervals around the means. The dotted line
represents chance performance since selecting the good explanation was one of three possible responses on each trial.

4

Study 2

3
2
1

Mixed

Without Neuroscience

With Neuroscience

of Condition and the Condition x Group interaction were not
significantly different across items.
To gain further insight into subjects’ responses, for the
two conditions that used explanations containing neuroscience language (With Neuroscience and Mixed), we performed a text search on subjects’ justifications for words related to neural processes generally (“brain”, “lobe,”, “scan”,
“neur*”) and for the specific neuroscience terms used in the
explanations themselves (“premotor,” “cortex”); 58% of justifications in these two conditions contained at least one of
these terms. A research assistant, who was blind to condition, group, and study hypotheses, further coded these justifications for whether subjects referred to the brain as adding
value to an explanation. For example, “this gives a biological explanation and uses brain parts to explain”, “brain scans
and timing seem more accurate”, and “it’s more in depth and
seems more factual because it is talking about brain parts
and stuff.” Of justifications that referenced the brain, 84%
did so in this positive way. The remaining justifications suggested a good grasp of the irrelevance of this information,
such as these undergraduates: “I do not want to hear about
what the brain is doing. I am interested in WHY the phenomenon occurs in a more general sense” and “Saying because of frontal lobe areas is not a sufficient explanation,
but just states where the processing is occurring.” Or, as
one MTurk worker put it, “Talking mumbo jumbo about the
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frontal lobes without explaining what is actually happening
is bullshit.”
Each subject was given a score (out of 4) for the number
of positive brain-based justifications they gave. A 2 (Group:
MTurk workers, undergraduates) x 2 (Condition: With Neuroscience, Mixed) ANOVA revealed only a significant main
effect of Group, F(1,166) = 7.08, p <.01, η 2 = .04: Undergraduates (M = 0.62, SD = 0.84) were overall more likely
than MTurk workers (M = 0.31, SD = 0.66) to refer to the
brain as adding value to an explanation. There was neither
a significant effect of Condition nor a significant Group x
Condition interaction.

3.3

0

Average # of trials on which good explanation was selected

MTurk Workers
Undergraduates
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Discussion

When asked to choose between good and bad explanations
of a psychological phenomenon, subjects selected the good
explanation as being more satisfying on the majority of trials. These results confirm subjects’ ratings from Study 1, in
which subjects tended to rate the good explanations more
positively. Taken together, these results demonstrate that
subjects understand the difference between good and bad
explanations.
The one exception to this conclusion is the Mixed condition, in which the bad explanation contained irrelevant
neuroscience information and the good explanation did not.
Here, subjects were seduced by the presence of neuroscience information, which made them less likely to prefer the good explanations than in the other conditions. Although the main effect of condition was significant in the
full sample, it was driven primarily by the undergraduates.
Indeed, the undergraduates’ justifications were more likely
to mention neuroscience in a positive light. This suggests
that the presence of neuroscience information played a key
role in convincing these subjects that the bad explanations
were satisfactory. As the justifications quoted above illustrate, some undergraduates appeared to rely on the presence
of neuroscience as a heuristic to judge the quality of an explanation.
It is not entirely clear why undergraduates would be more
attracted to explanations containing neuroscience information than MTurk workers, although currently learning about
psychological and neuroscientific phenomena might have
swayed the undergraduates to lend more weight to the presence of neuroscience. One possibility is that, since they currently are learning about the functions of the brain, reading
about specific phenomena in which the brain appears to play
a causal role leads them to judge explanations with neuroscience explanations more favorably. In support of this argument, students who were currently taking a course on neuroscience (Weisberg et al., 2008, Study 2) showed a stronger
attraction to explanations containing irrelevant neuroscience
information than students recruited from the introductory
psychology pool (Weisberg et al., 2008, Study 1).
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Finally, subjects’ performance in this study can start to
explain one of the item effects seen in Study 1. Specifically, in Study 1, the seeing/imagining item (Item 4) was
judged similarly regardless of quality or presence of neuroscience. Here in Study 2, about twice as many subjects
chose the “both are equal” option for this item than for the
other three, indicating that they could not see a difference
between the good and bad explanations for this item. The
difference between the two versions was very slight, changing only “uses the same process” to “results in the same array of responses”. In fact, a number of participants explicitly
stated in their justifications that the two explanations seemed
the same (e.g., “Both explanations sound like they are saying the same thing”, “Both explanations are similar and say
the same thing just in a slightly different way.”)

4 Study 3
Having determined that length does not underlie the seductive allure effect, and that neuroscience information is effective at disguising bad explanations, Study 3 tested another possible reason that neuroscience explanations are appealing to subjects, namely that this information tends to include technical jargon. If subjects are attracted to scientificsounding terms, then neuroscience information per se is not
seductive; subjects’ responses can be influenced by the presence of any jargon. However, technical language and references to the brain were confounded in the explanations used
thus far, preventing us from determining whether any reference to the brain would be sufficient or whether technical
jargon is necessary. Study 3 constructed alternative versions
of these explanations in order to tease out which type of information is responsible for the seductive allure effect.
This study’s design mirrored that of Study 1, in which
subjects read descriptions of psychological phenomena one
at a time and then rated one explanation of each phenomenon. In Study 3, these explanations came from one of
two sets: Simple Neuroscience, in which the explanations
referred to brain scans and neural processes but in simple
language without reference to specific brain areas, and Neuroscience Plus Jargon, in which the explanations included
technical terms to refer to the type of brain scan used and
the individual areas of the brain. In both cases, these stimuli were constructed by modifying the Short versions of the
stimuli used in Study 1, and the Short-Without Neuroscience
condition from that study serves as a control condition here.
This set of stimuli allows us to test among three hypotheses. If neuroscience information alone is responsible for
the seductive allure effect, we should expect similar ratings
for the Neuroscience Plus Jargon and the Simple Neuroscience explanations, both of which should be rated more
highly than the Without Neuroscience explanations. If neuroscience information appeals because it contains fancy jar-
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gon, then the Neuroscience Plus Jargon explanations should
be rated more highly than the other two, which should not
differ. Finally, there might be an additive effect of jargon
and neuroscience language, in which case the Neuroscience
Plus Jargon explanations would be rated more highly than
the Simple Neuroscience explanations, which would in turn
be rated more highly than the Without Neuroscience explanations.

4.1

Method

Subjects. The final sample for this study included 88 undergraduates (63 female, 25 male; mean age = 19.5 years,
range = 18–22) and 82 MTurk workers (42 female, 38 male,
two unreported; mean age = 35.0 years, range = 19–67). As
in previous studies, the undergraduates were recruited from
the psychology subject pool at the University of Pennsylvania and received course credit for their participation. The
MTurk workers were recruited from Amazon’s system and
were paid 20 cents for their participation. An additional 50
subjects completed the survey but were excluded from the
final analyses for failing an attention check (described below; 22 MTurk workers and 28 undergraduates). Although
more subjects failed the attention check here than in Study
2, the design of this study was different and may have presented a less engaging task than Study 2, and these numbers
are in line with other studies that included similar attention
checks (see Oppenheimer et al., 2009).
Design. This study used a 2 (Group: MTurk, undergraduate) x 2 (Neuroscience: Simple Neuroscience, Neuroscience
Plus Jargon) x 2 (Quality: good, bad) design. Group and
Neuroscience were between-subjects variables and Quality
was a within-subjects variable.3 Subjects were assigned to
either the Neuroscience Plus Jargon condition (42 MTurk
workers and 44 undergraduates) or the Simple Neuroscience
condition (40 MTurk workers and 44 undergraduates). Data
from the 45 MTurk workers and 45 undergraduates in the
Without Neuroscience-Short condition from Study 1 were
also used here for comparison.
Materials. To construct the stimuli, we used the same four
psychological phenomena as in Studies 1 and 2, and modified the With Neuroscience-Short explanations to fit the new
conditions (see supplemental materials). Explanations in the
Simple Neuroscience condition removed references to specific brain-scanning techniques or brain areas and replaced
them with generic terms (“brain scans”, “visual area”). Explanations in the Neuroscience Plus Jargon condition enhanced existing references to include as much specific jar3 As in Study 1, the randomization algorithm led to 11 subjects receiving
either good explanations on every trial or bad explanations on every trial.
The inclusion of these subjects did not affect any analyses, so they were
left in the sample.
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gon as possible (“fMRI scans”, “parietal lobe”). Each explanation had a good and a bad version, and this modified
information was exactly the same in both versions.

Table 4: Study 3 mixed-effects linear regression model
(∗ p < .05).
Predictor

Procedure. All subjects filled out an online survey on
Qualtrics. As in Study 1, for each of the four trials, subjects first read a description of one of the four psychological
phenomena, which appeared on the screen for 10 seconds
before they were allowed to advance. On the second screen,
this phenomenon description appeared again, followed by
one of the four possible explanations of the phenomenon,
according to the subject’s assigned condition; whether they
saw the good or bad version of the explanation was randomly determined on each trial (as described above in the
Design section). Subjects were asked to rate how satisfying
they found the explanation on a –3 (very unsatisfying) to +3
(very satisfying) scale. They were then asked to justify their
rating in one or two sentences.
As in Study 2, after the first two trials, we included an
attention check. This attention check presented another description of a psychological phenomenon and an explanation for it in exactly the same way as the other trials, except that the last sentence of the explanation told subjects
to select 3 on the scale. As noted above, 50 subjects failed
this attention check (by failing to select 3 and/or by demonstrating a lack of attentiveness in their justifications for this
item) and are not included in our analyses. At the end of the
survey, subjects responded to the same basic demographic
questions as in Studies 1 and 2, reporting their age, gender,
and highest level of education.

4.2

Results

In order to have a control condition with which to compare the current subjects’ responses, the analyses for this
study additionally include the responses from the subjects in
the Without Neuroscience-Short condition from Study 1 (45
MTurk workers and 45 undergraduates). Preliminary analyses revealed no effects of gender, so it was not included in
our analyses.
As in Study 1, we conducted a mixed-effects linear regression analysis. The model included random intercepts
by subject as well as random slopes by subject for the
effect of Quality (the only within-subjects variable). We
created two dummy variables to examine the effects of
neuroscience and jargon; the Neuroscience variable coded
whether neuroscience information was present (the Simple
Neuroscience and Neuroscience Plus Jargon conditions) or
absent (the Without Neuroscience condition). Similarly, the
Jargon variable coded whether jargon was present (the Neuroscience Plus Jargon condition) or absent (the Simple Neuroscience and Without Neuroscience conditions). The regression tested effects of Item, Group (MTurk or undergraduates), Neuroscience (present or absent), Jargon (present or
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Intercept
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Neuroscience
Group
Quality
Neuroscience x Item 2
Neuroscience x Item 3
Neuroscience x Item 4
Quality x Item 2
Quality x Item 3
Quality x Item 4

Estimate [95% CI]
0.02
0.33
–0.91
0.98
0.27
0.15
0.57
–0.37
–0.04
–0.05
0.12
–0.39
–0.57

[–0.19, 0.24]
[ 0.06, 0.62]
[–1.24, –0.62]
[ 0.69, 1.25]
[ 0.05, 0.51]
[ 0.05, 0.27]
[ 0.35, 0.78]
[–0.68, -0.07]
[–0.36, 0.27]
[–0.38, 0.28]
[–0.18, 0.44]
[–0.67, –0.07]
[–0.85, –0.25]

t
0.17
2.19∗
–5.97∗
6.44∗
2.44∗
2.64∗
5.39∗
–2.42∗
–0.23
–0.35
0.82
–2.62∗
–3.83∗

Note: This regression predicted subjects’ ratings of the quality of the explanations. The intercept represents the explanations that did not contain neuroscience, undergraduate subjects, and bad explanations. Item is deviation coded, such
that the coefficient for each level represents deviation from
the grand mean; Item 1 is the reference level.

absent), and Quality (good or bad) and their interactions; the
model that best fit the data is shown in Table 4.
The analysis revealed significant main effects of Group,
Quality, and Neuroscience (Figure 3). MTurk subjects (M
= 0.33, SD = 1.90) gave higher overall ratings than undergraduate subjects (M = 0.03, SD = 1.89) , and subjects rated
good explanations (M = 0.52, SD = 1.86) more highly than
bad explanations (M = –0.19, SD = 1.88), replicating the
results of Study 1. The significant main effect of Neuroscience indicates that explanations were rated more highly
in the two conditions that used neuroscience language (M =
0.29, SD = 1.95) than in the Without Neuroscience condition (M = –0.03, SD = 1.79). There was no significant effect
of Jargon, meaning that the Neuroscience Plus Jargon condition (M = 0.29, SD = 1.91) was not significantly different
from the other two combined (M = 0.12, SD = 1.89).
As in Study 1, the effects of Neuroscience and Quality
also varied by item, as indicated by significant interactions.
To examine these interactions, we conducted separate linear
regressions for each item examining main effects of Group,
Neuroscience, Length, and Quality. The results are summarized in Table 5. Although the magnitudes (and therefore significance levels) of the effects varied by item, only
two effects were not in the predicted directions; consistent
with Study 1, Item 2 had a negative, non-significant effect
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Figure 3: Average ratings of explanation quality in Study 3,
including the Without Neuroscience condition from Study
1. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals around the
means.
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Table 5: Regression coefficients for individual item analysis
in Study 3 (∗ p < .05).
Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4
Neuroscience 0.27∗ –0.09
Quality
0.55∗ 0.69∗
Group
0.04
0.32∗

3

Study 3

2

Good Explanations
Bad Explanations

0.24∗ 0.22∗
0.17 –0.01
0.18
0.08

Discussion

0
−3

−2

−1

Average Rating

1

4.3

Without Neuroscience

Simple Neuroscience

Neuroscience Plus Jargon

of Neuroscience, and Item 4 had a negative, non-significant
effect of Quality.
To analyze subjects’ justifications, we searched for all references to neuroscience, as in Study 2; 24% of all justifications referenced the brain, and 58% of those did so in a positive manner. A 2 (Group: MTurk workers, undergraduates)
x 2 (Condition: Simple Neuroscience, Neuroscience Plus
Jargon) ANOVA revealed no significant effects on subjects’
average number of positive brain-based justifications.
However, subjects’ justifications provide further insight
into one of the item effects. Many of the justifications for
the attentional blink item (Item 2), which did not show
a significant neuroscience effect, mentioned that the neuroscience information seemed unconnected with the phenomenon: e.g., “The explanation mentions the frontal lobe
areas but does not really say how the areas relate to attentional blink”, and “The explanation does not explain how
frontal areas are related to the temporal relationship between
the two houses.” This item effect was consistent with the
findings from Study 1, and justifications such as this support our suggestion that putting the information about the
frontal lobe in a separate sentence may have made it easier
for subjects to separate this information from the body of
the explanation, explaining the lesser effect of neuroscience
for this item.

Explanations with neuroscience information, whether presented as simply as possible without jargon or with reference
to specific neural techniques and brain areas, were more satisfying than explanations without neuroscience information.
However, there was no difference between the two neuroscience conditions. This suggests that any reference to neuroscience is sufficient to cause the effect, and that adding
technical jargon does not increase subjects’ ratings.
Additionally, subjects judged good explanations more
highly than bad ones, and undergraduate subjects gave overall lower ratings than MTurk workers. These effects replicate the findings of Study 1 and suggest two additional
conclusions. First, people can generally discriminate good
from bad explanations. Second, participating in research as
part of one’s educational experience seems to make subjects
more skeptical overall, but does not eliminate the seductive
allure effect.
These main effects were significant overall, but varied
somewhat by item. As in Study 1, the attentional blink item
(Item 2) did not show an effect of neuroscience information
and the seeing/imagining item (Item 4) did not show an effect of quality. In the case of the former, as noted above,
the neuroscience information was contained in a separate
sentence rather than being directly linked to the explanatory
information. This may have made it easier for subjects to
realize that this information was irrelevant. In the case of
latter, as in Studies 1 and 2, subjects seemed generally unable to tell the difference between the good and bad versions
of this item.

5 General discussion
The seductive allure effect of neuroscience, first observed
by Weisberg et al. (2008), occurs when subjects judge that
explanations for psychological phenomena (especially bad
ones) that contain irrelevant neuroscience information are
better than explanations that do not. The current studies provide new insight into why this effect happens.
First, although the original stimuli used to demonstrate this effect confounded neuroscience information
with length, our Study 1 and independent replications by
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Fernandez-Duque et al. (2015) and Rhodes et al. (2014;
2015) using different methods show that length does not account for the effect. Subjects do judge longer explanations
as significantly better, but they also judge explanations with
neuroscience information as significantly better when length
has been controlled for. Something about neuroscience information itself, then, is responsible for the effect.
Study 2 showed that, although subjects generally chose
correctly when explicitly comparing good and bad explanations, subjects were still seduced into choosing the bad
explanation when it contained neuroscience information but
the good explanation did not. Surprisingly, undergraduates’
justifications indicate that they explicitly used the presence
of neuroscience as a marker of a good explanation. These
results thus provide an especially direct demonstration of
the power of neuroscience information for this population.
These results also suggest that education in the field of psychology, at least at the introductory level, might aggravate
the effect. Further, results from Study 3 suggest that it is not
simply fancy terms or scientific jargon that seduces subjects.
Rather, any reference to the brain was sufficient to make an
explanation seem more satisfying than a logically parallel
explanation without any such references.
Having eliminated these potential explanations for the seductive allure effect, we are left with the general questions
of why this effect happens and of whether it is unique to psychology. One possibility is that people are generally skeptical about psychology (Ferguson, 2015; Keil, Lockhart &
Schlegel, 2010; Lilienfeld, 2012), believing that its investigative methods do not justify it as a “real science”. An
extreme version of this skepticism would endorse explanations that eliminate psychological terms altogether and utilize only neuroscience vocabulary. According to this theory,
explanations that reference “harder” sciences may be seen as
generally better across disciplines, but will have a more pronounced effect in psychology because of a general bias towards making psychological explanations sound “more scientific”. Indeed, this may have been the strategy adopted
by the undergraduates in Study 2, who explicitly reported
liking explanations more when they contained brain-based
language.
A second possibility is that people are intuitively dualist.
Even though people may explicitly assert that the brain is
involved in cognitive tasks, rejecting a strict Cartesian substance dualism, they may nevertheless fail to acknowledge
the causal role of the brain in all aspects of our mental and
emotional lives (Bloom, 2004, 2006). For example, in a recent study, subjects were told about a hypothetical machine
that could perfectly duplicate people or animals, down to
the very last cell (Forstmann & Burgmer, 2015). Subjects
typically said that physical traits, such as scars or illnesses,
would be preserved in the copy, but they were less likely to
say the same for mental traits, such as emotions or memories. Results like this suggest that people believe that some-
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thing over and above the physical brain is at least partly
responsible for thoughts and feelings. They may thus be
attracted to neuroscience information because they find it
surprising and compelling when neural activity is shown to
underlie mental activity. On this view, the seductive allure
effect may be unique to psychology, since issues of dualism
do not generally arise in other sciences.
A third possibility is that people may see explanations
that contain neuroscience as providing additional causal information. Previous work has shown that people are sensitive to descriptions of causes. For example, subjects are
less likely to ignore base rates when provided with information that causally links the base rates to the target outcome
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). People are also particularly
biased towards teleological information, which provides evidence of an ultimate cause for an event (Kelemen, 1999;
Lombrozo & Carey, 2006; Lombrozo, Kelemen & Zaitchik,
2007). Differential responses to our four stimulus items also
suggest that stronger effects obtain when the neuroscience
information is described as causally related to the explanation (e.g., “the parietal lobe governed the babies’ expectations . . . ”). If brain processes are seen as providing an underlying cause for the psychological phenomena in question,
then their appeal may be due to this general bias. Unlike the
previous two possibilities, if this explanation for the effect
is correct, then the effect should appear across a range of
sciences.
Finally, it possible that neuroscience seduces because of a
general preference for reductive explanations (Craver, 2007;
Garfinkel, 1981; Trout, 2007). These explanations recruit
the vocabularies and methods of scientific disciplines that
are considered more fundamental (Oppenheim & Putnam,
1958). This is not in itself an error; explanations with a
reductionist form are often of high quality. But the explanations in this case have this form without any accompanying content, since the reductionist (neuroscience) information did not provide any additional explanatory power.
If reductionism is indeed the key to explaining the seductive allure effect, then neuroscience information produces
the effect because people see psychology as dependent upon
neuroscience to verify its claims. If this is the case, then this
effect should not be unique to psychological phenomena, but
rather should appear across a variety of sciences. For example, an explanation of a biological phenomenon might be
seen as more satisfying when it includes references to chemical processes, even if the chemical information is irrelevant.
An ongoing study is investigating this hypothesis, drawing
phenomena and explanations from across the social and natural sciences to test whether the seductive allure effect may
appear in different disciplines. Results from this study can
cast additional light on why the effect happens.
Insights from experts can also help with this effort: Neuroscience experts in Weisberg et al. (2008) were not seduced
by information that came from their own domain of exper-
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tise (see also Eriksson, 2012), suggesting that increased education can be an effective antidote. If experts are immune
to some aspects of the seductive allure effect, their responses
can provide insight into how to prevent it.
Regardless of whether the seductive allure effect is specific to psychology or also appears in other fields, it has important implications for how scientific information is communicated to the public (Weisberg, 2008). Since some individuals may use the presence of neuroscience information
as a marker of a good explanation, like the undergraduates
who participated in Study 2, it is imperative to find ways
to increase general awareness of the proper role for neuroscience information in explanations of psychological phenomena. The present studies suggest that this effect is robust
against changes to an explanation’s length and to the terms
in which the neuroscience information is described, implying that preventing the seductive allure effect from happening may be difficult. Future studies should continue to investigate why neuroscience information is so alluring, and
to what types of subjects, in order to combat the superfluous appeals to neuroscience that are currently popular—and
convincing—in public debates.
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